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In the Supreme Court. 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. \ Case No. 7406 
JOE PETRALIA, ( 
Defendant and Appellant. } 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by the defendant, Joe Petralia, from 
the verdict of the jury finding him guilty of the crime of Grand 
Larceny, and the sentence of the court thereon. 
The brief of appellant contains a summary of the facts 
which were presented to the court and jury upon which the 
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defendant was convicted and duly sentenced. Although ap-
pellant's brief presents the facts in a manner to best serve the 
arguments of appellant in his Statement of Errors, it is felt 
that a recapitulation here would serve no useful purpose. 
Respondent will therefore refrain from making an independent 
presentation of the facts at this time but will do so where 
necessary in order to portray a version which may be at 
variance with that of the appellant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The court did not err in denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
II. The defendant was not prejudiced by the contempt 
proceedings. 
III. The court did not unreasonably restrict the voir dire 
examination of the prospective jurors to the prejudice of the 
defendant. 
IV. The court did not err in admitting in evidence the 
testimony of Wayne Smith and various State's exhibits. 
V. The court did not commit prejudicial error in instruct-
ing the jury. 
VI. The court did not err in refusing to give to the JUry 
defendant's requested instruction No. 1. 
VII. The court did not err in refusing to give to the jury 
defendant's requested instruction No. 5. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
This Honorable Court has on numerous occasions held 
that the granting or refusing of a motion for a new trial 
rests exclusively in: the sound discretion of the trial court 
and that the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed 
unless it appears that it has been abused to the prejudice of 
the defendant. State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P. (2d) 167; 
State v. Mellor, 73 Utah 104, 272 P. 635; State v. Montgomery, 
37 Utah 515, 109 P. 815. 
An examination of the record in this case will reveal 
that grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 set forth in appellant's Motion 
for New Trial were not supported by affidavits as required 
by the provisions of Section 105-39-4, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, and therefore may not now be considered. It is re-
spectfully submitted that the record does not reveal that the 
trial court abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant 
in denying appellant's motion for a new trial. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY 
THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS. 
Appellant contends that the court committed prejudicial 
error in imposing and levying a fine upon the defendant for 
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contempt of court (Br. 26). Withdut assuming one way or 
the other whether the court exceeded its jurisdiction in impos-
ing a contempt fine of $208.00 or whether His Honor acted 
~apriciously and arbitrarily in finding the deefndant in con-
tempt of court and in requiring him to pay a fine of $208.00 
to purge himself, respondent respectfully submits that the 
record shows that the defendant was not prejudiced by this 
action. It will be noted that no jurors were present in the 
court room during the contempt proceedings (Br. 4), and 
kppellant fails to point out where any rulings or orders during 
·the course of the trial appear to have been influenced by any 
daimed bias or prejudice of His Honor as a result of the 
contempt proceedings. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT UNREASONABLY RE-
STRICT THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF THE 
I 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
Appellant contends that the defendant was prejudiced by 
the manner in which he claims the court unduly and arbitrarily 
restricted the examination of the prospective jurors upon voir 
dire (Br. 29). The purpose of the voir dire examination is 
to secure for the defendant an impartial and disinterested jury, 
and he must therefore be given a reasonable opportunity to 
obtain such a jury. It is always essential, however, that the 
examination be conducted in good faith and, so that prejudice 
will not be engendered, it is within the exercise of the wise 
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discretion of the court to safeguard the course of the question-
ing. Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P. (2d) 224. An exatni-
nation of the transcript will reveal that defendant's counsel 
questioned fourteen of the sixteen prospective jurors called 
to the jury box at great length in selecting the jury which 
would try the case ( Tr. 4-15). This was so even though the 
court did indicate that it might limit counsel's questions (Tr. 
5). As a matter of fact, the only admonition given by the 
court in the course of counsel's examination was that his 
examination be limited to interrogating rather than lecturing 
the jury (Tr. 6), and, that the examination of Mr. Jensen was 
repetitious on the question of the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant (Tr. 7). In answer to counsel's prior questions, 
Mr. Jensen had already stated that he had formed no opinion 
concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendant (Tr. 6). 
It may be interesting to note here that not only did the 
court not prevent or even suggest that the examination of the 
prospective jurors be discontinued but there was no attempt 
made by counsel for appellant to challenge any of the pros-
pective jurors for cause. Furthermore, the record shows that 
Mr. Jensen, the prospective juror whom counsel for appellant 
cites as an example where the voir dire examination was 
claimed to have been unduly and arbitrarily restricted, was 
not one of the jurors who tried the case. 
It is respectfully submitted that the record fails to· support 
the contention that the voir dire examination of the jurors 
was unduly and arbitrarily restricted to the prejudice of the 
defendant. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING IN 
EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY OF WAYNE SMITH AND 
VARIOUS STATE'S EXHIBITS. 
It is contended that the court committed error in admitting 
in evidence State's Exhibits "B," "C," "E," "F," "G," "H," 
"1," "]," "K," and "M" and the testimony of Wayne Smith. 
the only objection to such exhibits and the disputed testimony 
both at the time of introduction and as argued in appellant's 
brief was that the same were "incompetent, irrelevant and im-
material." 
With reference to the stock objection that the evidence 
or testimony is "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial," it 
was said in Hungate v. Hudson, 353 Mo. 944, 185 SW (2d) 
646, 157 A.L.R. 598, that: 
" * * * as a rule, the general objections of irrelevancy 
and immateriality call for no more action on the part 
of the court than the assigned objections imply,-i£ 
more is expected or required of the court or there are 
other reasons the cross-examination is improper or the 
evidence is inadmissible specific objections must be 
made for those reasons." 
In the course of its opinion the Missouri court went on further 
to hold, in substance, that the admission in evidence of facts 
entirely immaterial to the issues and without probative force 
is not reversible error, especially when the facts evidenced 
are of such a character that they do not have a natural tendency 
to inflame or arouse hostile passions and their prejudicial 
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effect is not otherwise made to appear. 
Assuming, merely for purpose of argument, that part or 
all of the exhibits and the testimony referred to were "in-
competent, irrelevant and immaterial," counsel for appellant 
does not claim that prejudicial error was committed by the 
court. In referring to the disputed exhibits and testimony, 
counsel's only argument concerning their inadmissibility is 
as follows: (Br. 35) 
"None of this was ever brought home to Petralia, 
and all was mere 'dressing,' and attempts to prove in 
advance that which was not contradicted. 
"Manifestly irrelevant and incompetent." 
Dealing generally with the admission of tmproper evi-
dence, it is said in 5 C. J. S. 1009, Sec. 1732: 
"It is a well-settled general rule that it is harmless 
error for the court, in the conduct of the trial, to permit 
the introduction of irrelevant, incompetent, or other 
improper evidence relating to a fact which is admitted, 
conceded, uncontroverted, or which has been placed 
beyond the realm of dispute by uncontradicted evidence 
which has been adduced, or by agreement or stipulation 
of the parties; since, under the circumstances, the 
evidence could not mislead the jury.'' 
The rule generally recognized by the authorities is that 
anounced by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma in 
L. 0. & H. L. Street v. Arnold, 40 P. (2d) 1050, 170 Okla. 
389, wherein it was said: 
"One who complains that the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence, over his obje~tions, must be able 
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to show wherein said evidence was detrimental to liis 
cause." 
In this case, aside from the fact that counsel for appellant 
~omplains that the disputed evidence and testimony was "in~ 
~ompetent, irrelevant and immaterial," there is no showing 
whatsoever that it was prejudicial or of such a character as to 
have a tendency to inflame or arouse the hostile passions of 
the jury. On the contrary, it is submitted that a careful reading 
of the transcript will show the competency, relevancy and 
!llateriality. of the disputed evidence and, that in any event, no 
harmful error was committed in its admission. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY. 
It is strenuously urged by counsel for appellant that· 
the court committed prejudicial and reversible error in using 
the phrase "from the immediate presence" rather than "from 
the person" in instructing the jury concerning the crime of 
Grand Larceny in Instructions No. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11. It is 
true, as appellant contends, that in instructing the jury the 
court did state that Grand Larceny is committed when the 
property is taken "from the immediate presence" rather than 
"from the person" of another, as set forth in subsection 2 of 
Section 103-36-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Courts have 
held, however, that the phrase "from the person" is sub-
stitutionary or tantamount in meaning to the phrase "from the 
immediate presence." Mahoney v. State, 180 NE 580; Porello 
10 
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'v. State, 121 Ohio St. 280, 168 NE 135; State v. Lamb, 242 
Mo. 398, 146 SW 1169; People v. Kubish, 357 Ill. 531, 192 
NE 543; State v. Craft, 299 Mo. 332, 253 SW 224; O'Donnell 
v. People, 224 Ill. 218, 79 NE 639; and Jackson v. State, 114 
Ga. 826, 40 SE 1001. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court- of the State of Utah 
in State v. O'Day, 93 Utah 387, 73 P. (2d) 965, stated: 
"We have read the transcript carefully, and, if any 
property was taken, it was taken from the person or 
immediate presence of complaining witness, so it could 
not be less than grand larceny or robbery." 
Counsel for appellant admits that there was evidence that 
property was taken from the "immediate presence" of Steve 
and Anazawa (Br. 39}. Ifl view of the judicial construction 
which has been placed on the phrase "from the person," it 
cannot be argued successfully that prejudicial error was com-
mitted by the court in instructing the jury as it did concerning 
the crime of Grand Larceny. 
It is urged also that the court committed prejudicial error 
in giving Instruction No. 9 in that it unduly commented upon 
the evidence and assumed as a fact that Steve and Anazawa 
were robbed. Co~nsel argues that "the instruction, as given, 
was calculated to carry the thought to the jury that the judge in 
the case thought the defendant guilty," and concludes that, 
"the form of this instruction ought not to be approved, al-
though it may not be sufficient standing alone to justify a 
new trial (Br. 41). Whatever inferences may be drawn from 
the language in Instruction No. 9, that instruction must be 
11 
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construed in harmony with and considered in the light of all 
the other instructions which were given. Any inferences, 
whether reasonable or unreasonable, which could be drawn 
from the language of that instruction to the effect that the 
judge thought a robbery had been committed or that the 
defendant was guilty, were certainly negatived by His Honor 
in instructing the jury in Instruction No. 27 as follows: 
·'The court does not express any opinion of any of 
the facts in the case, and it is immaterial what the views 
of the court thereon may be. Neither by these instruc-
tions nor by any words uttered or remarks made during 
the trial does the court intimate or mean or wish to be 
understood as giving an opinion as to what the proof 
is or what it is not, or what the facts are or what are 
not the facts in this case." 
The instructions pointed out specifically that the burden 
was on the state to prove every material allegation in the in-
formation beyond a reasonable doubt; that the defendant was 
not required to prove his defense of alibi beyond a reasonable 
doubt but should be acquitted if the evidenced raised a reason-
able doubt as to his presence at the time and place of the com-
mission of the crime; that a conviction could not be had upon 
the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices; and, that the 
defendant was presumed to be innocent until proved guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is respectfully submitted that 
with these and the other precautionary instructions which 
were given and more particularly with the admonition of 
the court in Instruction No. 27 that, "Neither by these instruc-
tions nor by any words uttered or remarks made during the 
trial does the court intimate or mean or wish to be understood 
12 
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as to what the proof is or what it is not, or what the facts are 
or what are not the facts," the court did not err in giving In-
struction No. 9. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
TO THE JURY DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO.1. 
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 1 was as follows: 
"You are instructed to return a verdict of 'not guilty' 
in favor of the defendant and to so say by your verdict." 
In connection with this requested instruction, it is argued that 
the evidence in the case did not corrobate the testimony of 
he witness, Salerno, and that it was the duty of the court to 
determine as a matter of law whether or not there was sufficient 
evidence to corrobate his testimony. Section 105-32-18, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, does prohibit a finding of guilty upon 
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. It reads: 
"A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of 
an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evi-
dence, which in itself and without the aid of the testimony 
of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant with 
the commission of the offense; and the corroboration 
shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows the commission 
of the offense or the circumstances thereof." 
The general rule with reference to whether or not there 
is a legal sufficiency of evidence to warrant its submission to 
the jury is set forth in 23 C. J. S. 651, Sec. 1139, as follows: 
13 
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"Whether there is a legal sufficiency of evidence 
in support of the material issues of the case which will 
warrant its submission to the jury is a question of law 
for the court, in determining which it is only necessary 
that there should be so much proof as to make it proper 
to submit the evidence to the jury, and not that the 
court should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Evidence of motive alone is not sufficient to take the 
case to the jury. Where, however, there is any evidence, 
however slight, on which the jury may justifiably find 
the existence or the nonexistence of material facts in 
issue, and the evidence is conflicting, or of such a 
character that different conclusions as to such facts 
reasonably may be drawn therefrom, the issues should 
be submitted to the jury for determination, even though 
the court does not beJ ieve the evidence, or is of the 
opinion that it is not sufficient to convict, or is doubtful 
whether the evidence presented will be convincing to 
the jury. In such a case, it is error for the court to take 
the issue from the jury by dismissal or nonsuit, or by 
the direction of a verdict, or by excluding the evidence 
from the jury." 
In commenting upon the corroborative evidence in the record, 
counsel for appellant admits that there is some evidence but 
goes on to say, "when all is said and done, it is largely a 
matter of impression with the reviewing court, whether or not 
the case should have been taken from the jury." Thus, by 
his own admission, it would have been error for the court 
to have withdrawn the case from the jury even though the 
evidence of corroboration may have been slight and even 
though the court may not have believed the evidence. 
A perusal of the record shows that the evidence amply 
supports and corroborates the testimony of Tony Salerno. 
The testimony of George Pappas shows that on or about July 
1·1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i:C. 
::r 
J.t 
. !7 
... -
:, ... '· 
·12, 1948, Joe Petralia called him by telephone and told him 
that he wanted to give the money back if there was a way 
(Tr. 45-6). Also, during the course of a conversation in Bell, 
California, on July 15, 1948, that Joe Petralia told him the 
boys only got about $17,600 and· t~at in the get-away they 
·lost between $400-$500 silver dollp.rs (Tr. 47-8). Later, 
when George Pappas asked Joe Petralia about a gun of his 
which he claimed the boys had taken, Joe replied that one 
of the boys had thrown iJ oyt" of the car on the right side 
- on the highway where the viaduct is located (Tr. 49). Fur-
thermore, during that visit, Joe Petralia made arrangerp.ents 
to return $6,000.00 to George Pappas in a shoe box (Tr. 50). 
The record shows, too, that as Joe Petralia was taking George 
Pappas to the station to return to Ogden, Utah, he did give 
George Pappas a package (Tr. 53). Such testimony certainly 
corroborated the testimony of Tony Salerno in associating 
and implicating the defendant, Joe Petralia, in the offense for 
which he was finally convicted. These actions, if the testimony 
can be believed, do not evidence anything other than the fact 
that Joe Petralia did participate in and was guilty of the 
offense for which he was convicted . 
The testimony of Harry Pappas substantiated the testimony 
of George Pappas that his brother George did receive a pack-
age from Joe Petralia containing $6,000.00. This, too, it 
is submitted, corroborates the testimony of Tony Salerno 
(Tr. 85-6). 
The testimony of Fae Shelby Rugg shows that Joe 
Petralia called upon Tony Salerno at an auto court at Bell, 
California, in the spring of 1948 (Tr. 242-3-4). That during 
15 
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the course of the conversation they (Joe Petralia and Tony 
Salerno) talked about money and insurance (Tr. 245), and 
that it wouldn't cost Harry and George anything because they 
were heavily insured (Tr. 245). Not only was she a witness 
to that conversation, but she herself had a conversation with 
Joe Petralia following the robbery, at which time she told 
him that he'd been very clever in all his maneuvers except in 
not seeing Tony Salerno (Tr. 248). Can it be said that this, 
along with all the other evidence in the record, does not 
implicate the defendant Joe Petralia and corroborate the testi-
mony of Tony Salerno ? 
Finally, the testimony of the policeman, Henry Allred, 
was to the effect he had known Joe Petralia for approximately 
fifteen years prior to the robbery of the Club and that he had 
seen Joe near the door of the Alexander Cafe on 25th and 
Lincoln Streets in Ogden, Utah, on June 24, 1948, the night 
before the robbery (Tr. 251). 
It is respectfully submitted that to deny that the above 
and the other evidence in the record corroborates the testi-
mony of Tony Salerno in implicating him with the offense for 
which he was convicted, is to refuse to admit the obvious. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
TO THE JURY DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO.5. 
Counsel for appellant argues that the court committed 
16 
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prejudicial error in refusing to give defendant's requested 
Instruction No. 5 which attempted to submit to the jury·· the 
question of whether a robbery was in fact committed or 
whether the whole ~bing was a "frame-up" or "phoney." 
Counsel urges that the jury should have been given an oppor-
tunity to consider the "realities." 
In answering this argument it is submitted that a review 
of the record will establish without question that of necessity 
the jury must have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant, Joe Petralia, was guilty of the offense for 
which he was convicted and that the offense was in truth and 
in fact actually committed. Rather than being a matter of 
submitting the question of the realities to the jury, it appears 
that counsel for appellant would have the jury, His Honor at 
the trial below and the members of This Honorable Court 
close their eyes to all reality. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the entire record and the law in relation 
thereto reveals that the defendant, Joe Petralia, was afforded 
a fair trial in accordance with established legal principles 
and that the proceedings were free from prejudicial error. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the verdict of the 
jury finding him guilty of the crime of Grand Larceny and 
17 
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the judgment of the court thereon should be affirmed by this 
Honorable Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON 
Assistant Attorney Gene1'al 
Attorneys for Respondent 
18 
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